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NOTE
A NEW DIRECTION IN ATTORNEY ADVERTISING:
FLORIDA BAR V. WENT FOR IT, INC.
INTRODUCrION
Attorney advertising is an issue that has sparked intense debate
among both members of the bar and members of the public. Adver-
tising has been justified as a means of informing the public of their
legal rights and the availability of legal services. But advertising is
also viewed as "trolling for cases"' and as an activity beneath the dig-
nity of such a noble profession.' Attempts to restrict advertising pro-
duce intense debate. Those in favor of advertising cry censorship at
any attempt to restrict it. They attack restrictions as an attempt by the
established bar to close ranks and limit the ability of new, unestab-
lished attorneys to develop a clientele.3 Those opposed to advertising
point to the lack of professionalism exhibited by many of the adver-
tisements and the adverse impact they have on the profession's image.
They argue that certain types of mass media advertising perpetuate
the public's image of attorneys as hired guns, ambulance chasers, and
money hungry sharks searching for someone to sue.4 Direct mail so-
licitations and demeaning television commercials are the usual targets
of such criticism.
Recently, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of direct mail so-
licitation in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.5 The Court held a thirty-
day ban on direct mail solicitation of accident victims constitutional.
The decision marks what could be a major turning point in the Court's
stance on attorney advertising. For the first time, the Court recog-
nized "upholding the integrity of the legal profession" as a state inter-
est sufficient to justify restrictions on attorney advertising.
1. E. Vernon F. Glenn, A Pox on our House: Televised Lawyer Advertising Compromises
the Profession, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1993, at 116.
2. Whether the law is still a noble profession is a point of debate in itself. It is this author's
position that despite the economic factors at work in the legal marketplace, practice of the law
can and should be treated as a profession rather than a trade. See infra notes 6-9 and accompa-
nying text.
3. See e.g., Whitney Thier, Comment, In a Dignified Manner The Bar, the Court, and
Lawyer Advertising, 66 TuL. L. REv. 527 (1991).
4. See, eg., Katherine A. LaRoe, Much Ado About Barratry: State Regulation of Attorneys'
Targeted Direct Mail Solicitation, 25 St. Mary's L. J. 1513 (1994).
5. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
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Part I of this note focuses on the history of attorney advertising and
restrictions against it. Part II examines the majority and dissenting
opinions in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., focusing on the recogni-
tion of this new state interest. Part III examines the need for restric-
tions and ways in which this new state interest might be used to justify
an increased level of control over attorney advertising by the States.
Part IV stresses the need for state bar organizations to implement re-
strictions to provide some level of dignity and professionalism to at-
torney advertising and a greater sense of integrity to the profession as
a whole.
BACKGROUND
Restrictions on attorney advertising are not of recent vintage. In
fact, the restrictions can be traced to the early common law in Eng-
land. Practice of the law was a profession, as opposed to a trade or
occupation, distinguished from other callings by the public service in-
herent in its practice.6 "The term [profession] refers to a group of
men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of a pub-
lic service .... ,"7 Pursuing this learned art was the lawyer's primary
goal; earning a livelihood was incidental to that.8 Because income was
simply a by-product of the profession, soliciting business in any way
was viewed as inappropriate and beneath the dignity of such a noble
profession.
The notion of law as a profession carried over to the colonies as did
the restrictions on openly soliciting business. The restrictions became
a matter of ethics drafted into early codes and canons adopted by
newly forming bar associations. 10 These ethical rules remained in
place well into the last quarter of this century. Attorney advertise-
ments were treated like any other commercial speech which, until the
1970's, was given no constitutional protection. 1 The state, through its
6. RoscoE PoUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANnQurrY TO MODERN Tnmms 5 (1953).
7. Id.
8. Id. Those entering the Inns of Court in England were usually second sons of wealthy
landowners whose family wealth allowed them to practice the profession without concern for
monetary gain. The lack of concern for monetary gain might also be attributed to the influence
of ecclesiastical courts in England in which priests were often also members of the bar. Id. at 95-
130.
9. At this point the rules against soliciting business were a matter of etiquette. See H.
Dnrtocn, LEGAL ETimcS 5, 210-11 (1953).
10. See POUND, supra note 6, at 175-221 for discussion of Bar Organizations in their forma-
tive years.
11. The rule had been established that "while the First Amendment guards against govern-
ment restriction of speech in most contexts, 'the Constitution imposes no such restraint on gov-
ernment as respects purely commercial advertising.' " Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
at 2375 (quoting Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)).
1996]
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bar association, was free to restrict commercial advertising by
attorneys.
That rule remained the law until 1977 when the Supreme Court de-
cided Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.12 In Bates, an attorney placed an
advertisement in a local paper listing not only his name, address, and
areas of practice, but detailing set fees for certain services. 13 The ad-
vertisement was a clear violation of local Bar Rules which prohibited
any form of commercial advertisement by attorneys.1 4 The Court held
that although the advertisement was commercial speech, it was enti-
tled to some degree of constitutional protection.' 5 The restriction
against advertising fees for routine legal services was held to be un-
constitutional. The Court held that "advertising by attorneys may not
be subjected to blanket suppression"1 6 and summarily dismissed
claims that advertising would have a detrimental impact on the level
of professionalism or public opinion of the profession.1 7
In his dissent, Justice Powell recognized the reasoning behind re-
laxing the proscription against attorney advertising but expressed his
reluctance to provide constitutional protection to commercial
speech.' 8 -Powell also argued that the majority had gone too far in
removing the state's ability to supervise activities of the members of
the legal profession, and predicted that this decision would have un-
foretold consequences.19 Powell argued that the state has an interest
in regulating lawyers sufficient to justify restrictions on advertising:
"the interest of the State in regulating lawyers is especially great since
lawyers are essential to the primary government function of adminis-
tering justice, and have historically been officers of the court. 2 0
In a series of subsequent cases, the Court repeatedly upheld the
general rule established in Bates that lawyer advertising was commer-
cial speech subject to some level of constitutional protection.2 ' The
12. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 355.
15. This decision was an extension of the Court's earlier ruling in Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1975), that commercial
advertisements were entitled to some degree of Constitutional protection.
16. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
17. Id. at 368-69.
18. Id. at 398.
19. Id. at 389. "[I]t is clear that within undefined limits today's decision will effect profound
changes in the practice of law, viewed for centuries as a learned profession. The supervisory
power of the courts over members of the bar as officers of the court, and the authority of the
respective States to oversee the regulations of the profession have been weakened." Id.
20. Id. at 401.
21. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (state interest in preventing undue
influence justified rule barring in-person solicitation); In Re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (attor-
ney's advertisement of services not explicitly listed in Disciplinary Rule outlining permissible
advertising protected); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,
3
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Court analyzed attorney advertising cases using the "intermediate
scrutiny" test developed for commercial speech cases in the Central
Hudson case " Under Central Hudson, advertising may be prohibited
when it is misleading or concerns an unlawful activity. 3 If the activity
is lawful and not misleading, the advertisement may still be regulated
if the state meets a three-prong test: 1) the state must assert a sub-
stantial interest in support of the regulation; 2) the regulation must
directly advance the governmental interest asserted; and 3) the regula-
tions must be no more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest.24
In Bates and its progeny, the states proffered various "interests" in
support of their restrictions on attorney advertising. These interests
included maintaining professionalism among licensed attorneys,2'
avoiding inherently misleading advertising,26 preventing lawyers from
stirring up unnecessary litigation,27 protecting the privacy of the
home,28 avoiding the high cost to states of determining which ads were
deceptive and which were not,29 ensuring that attorneys maintain dig-
nity in their communications with the public, 30 and avoiding confusion
of the general public.3 1 The Court found each of these to be insuffi-
cient justifications for restrictions. In fact, the state in Bates had prof-
fered its interest as protecting the integrity of the legal profession, but
the Court felt that "the assertion that advertising will diminish the
attorney's reputation in the community is open to question."32
Following Justice Powell's reasoning, dissenting opinions were filed
in several of the cases that followed Bates. In Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of Ohio,33 Justice O'Connor continued to argue
for the state's interest in protecting the integrity of the legal profes-
sion. "The States understandably require more of attorneys than of
others engaged in commerce. Lawyers are professionals, and as such
471 U.S. 626 (1985) (advertisements and solicitations of Dalkon Shield victims which contained
legal advice was constitutionally protected); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988)
(solicitations sent directly to members of public facing foreclosure held protected from
restriction).
22. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
23. Id. at 566.
24. Id.
25. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977).
26. Id. at 372.
27. Id. at 376.
28. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988).
29. Zauderer v. Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 646 (1985).
30. Id. at 648.
31. Id.
32. Bates, 433 U.S. at 369.
33. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
1996]
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they have greater obligations."'34 Justice O'Connor further argued
that the State's interest extends to ensuring that lawyers
"[c]onsistently exercise independent professional judgment on behalf
of their clients.135 In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,36 Justice
O'Connor again argued in dissent that "States should have considera-
ble latitude to ban advertising... that undermines the substantial gov-
ernmental interest in promoting the high ethical standards that are
necessary in the legal profession."'37 It was on this foundation that the
Court decided Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.
TkiE CASE
in late 1990, the Florida Supreme Court adopted amendments to
the State's lawyer advertising rules proposed by the Florida Bar.
These amendments included a ban on direct mail solicitation of acci-
dent victims within thirty days of an accident.3 Went For It, Inc., a
lawyer referral service, filed an action for declaratory and injunctive
relief. The service alleged that it routinely sent targeted solicitations
to accident victims within thirty days after accidents and wished to
continue doing So.39 The District Court entered summary judgment
for the plaintiffs,40 and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed relying on Bates
and its progeny.41
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion for the majority. O'Connor
wrote that "States have a compelling interest in the practice of profes-
sions within their boundaries," 42 and that the regulation in this case
was a valid restriction designed "to protect the flagging reputations of
Florida lawyers by preventing them from engaging in conduct that...
is universally regarded as deplorable and beneath common de-
cency."43 In support of its contention, the Florida Bar submitted a 106
page summary of its two-year study of lawyer advertising and solicita-
tion, which the Court found to be more than sufficient.44
In dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that the thirty-day ban prohib-
ited attorneys from providing potential clients with vital information
34. I& at 676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 678.
36. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
37. Id. at 485 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
38. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2374 (1995).
39. Id.
40. McHenry v. The Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (McHenry is the owner
and operator of Went For It, Inc. and was not a party to the case on appeal).
41. 21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 1994). The Court stated that "[w]e are disturbed that Bates and
its progeny require the decision we reach today." Id. at 1045.
42. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376 (citation omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2377.
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concerning their legal rights.45 Kennedy also argued that this ban
kept plaintiffs' attorneys at bay while insurance adjustors and their
attorneys were free to contact the unrepresented person.46
ANALYSIS
A New State Interest
The majority opinion in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. marks a
dramatic turning point in the Supreme Court's analysis of attorney
advertising cases.47 Since the Court's decision in Bates, with only one
exception, every case which has reached the Court has resulted in an
expansion of the advertising activities in which an attorney may en-
gage.' The Florida Bar case is the first to uphold a restriction on
advertising not based on overreaching or undue influence. 49
This decision provides state bar organizations with a new justifica-
tion for restricting attorney advertising. With the goal of protecting
the integrity of the legal profession, states can now adopt more strin-
gent regulations to control advertising that is distasteful or demean-
ing. For example, a television commercial airing locally in North
Carolina shows an attorney sitting in what appears to be one of those
quarter-a-ride spaceships you would find in front of a discount store.
The attorney promotes his firm by promising to come to an accident
victim wherever they may be. The attorney, in his spaceship, then flies
off into space with the firm's "jingle" playing in the background.50
The commercial never mentions time limits within which to bring suit,
rights of the injured to locate an attorney, nor does it warn potential
clients against the danger of signing settlement papers. In short, the
commercial conveys none of the informational aspects of the law Jus-
45. Id. at 2381.
46. Id.
47. This turning point was caused not so much by a change of heart among members of the
Court but by the recent changes in its composition. "[T]he dissenters -most recently O'Connor,
Rehnquist, and Scalia - have remained on the Court, while the strongest advocates of constitu-
tionally protected commercial speech - Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun - have left the Court."
Jonathan K. Van Patten, Essay, Lawyer Advertising, Professional Ethics, and the Constitution, 40
S.D. L. Rev. 212,216 (1995). Justice Thomas, not surprisingly, joined his conservative counter-
parts in the majority. Of the other recent appointees - Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer -
only Justice Breyer joined the majority. Stephen Gillers, an ethics professor at New York Uni-
versity School of Law noted that "[i]f two of the newer justices were prepared to join the [Sha-
pero] dissenters in overruling Bates, this case could have been a real Waterloo for attorney
advertising. Instead it is a defeat for attorney advertising that is painted on a very small canvas."
Richard C. Reuben, Florida Bar's Ad Restriction Constitutional, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 20.
48. See supra note 21 for list of post-Bates cases. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
477 (1978) is the only exception to that rule.
49. Ohralik involved undue influence and overreaching inherent in face-to-face solicitation.
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tice Kennedy felt inclined to protect.51 These types of commercials
which convey no vital information and place the profession in such
disrepute could be controlled by more stringent restrictions justified in
the name of protecting the integrity of the legal profession.
The Need for Restrictions
Recognition of the state's interest in protecting the integrity of the
legal profession is long overdue. With the string of Supreme Court
cases since Bates, states have all but lost the ability to control advertis-
ing by attorneys. The only restriction the Court had upheld to this
point prohibited in-person solicitations.5 With their hands tied by the
Supreme Court, state bar associations had little power to stop a tidal
wave of advertising that has had an increasingly adverse impact on the
public's perception of the role lawyers play in society.53 In Bates, Jus-
tice Blackmun argued that, "with advertising, most lawyers will be-
have as they always have: They will abide by their solemn oaths to
uphold the integrity and honor of the profession and of the legal sys-
tem."54 Unfortunately, this has not proven to be the case. Attorney
advertising has increasingly fallen to new levels of bad taste. It is
ironic that in a decision that dramatically reduced the state's power to
regulate attorney advertising, Justice Blackmun argued that, "it will be
in [the interest of the honest and straightforward attorney], as in other
cases of misconduct at the bar, to assist in weeding out those few who
abuse their trust."55 Justice Blackmun left it to members of the bar to
police their own but took away their "police" powers.
Critics of the majority may ask why there is a need to restrict adver-
tising at all. What actual harm is being done? Commercial advertis-
ing, particularly distasteful commercials, adversely affect not only the
public's perception of attorneys, but also of the courts and the entire
judicial system.56 We as attorneys hold a unique and powerful posi-
tion in society. We are the means of access to the courts. The public,
in most cases, must seek out the assistance of an attorney whenever
they have a wrong that needs to be righted. But with that power
comes responsibility. If attorneys are the gateway to the legal system,
and the public has no respect for attorneys, then the public will like-
51. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
52. Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
53. See John Sansing, The Business of Lawyers is - Lawyers, S.F. CHRomN., Feb. 17, 1991, at
Z12; Legal Crackdown; It's Tee to Clean up Predatory Tactics, DA.. MoRN. NEWS, Mar. 24,
1993, at A24.
54. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379.
55. Id.
56. W. Ward Reynoldson, The Case Against Lawyer Advertising; Professionalism, A.B.A. J.,
Jan. 1989, at 60.
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wise have no respect for the legal system. "Solemn forums for the
litigation of cases whose lawyer-officers resemble carnival barkers at
the doors scarcely can avoid being viewed as carnivals, or at least,
places where justice is bought and sold as in any marketplace."'57 As
officers of the court, we have a responsibility to uphold the integrity of
the entire legal system. The profession itself carries with it a dignity58
which each of us has a responsibility to uphold.59 The individual
States through their bar associations should have the power to deter-
mine which advertisements and solicitations lower the integrity of the
profession and restrict them accordingly. The Florida Bar decision
gives them that power.
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy argues that after an accident it may
be urgent to gather evidence, interview witnesses, and perform an ad-
equate investigation.60 Kennedy argues that the need for this infor-
mation creates a vital interest in expression that is jeopardized when
an attorney can not direct a letter to the victim explaining this fact.61
This argument ignores the alternative methods of communicating in-
formation on the need and availability of legal services (and sounds
very similar to a justification for ambulance chasing). Television, ra-
dio, and newspaper advertisements as well as the yellow pages are
replete with information on legal rights and available representation.
The information is there for the taking. It is up to members of the
public to make the conscious decision to assert their legal rights and
contact an attorney. Attorneys can not do it for them.
Kennedy also argues that while plaintiffs' attorneys are held at bay,
insurance adjustors and their attorneys are free to contact the victim,
gather evidence, and offer settlement.6 Again, this argument assumes
that the public is unaware of their legal rights and the availability of
counsel. For the vast majority, the information sources discussed
above are more than sufficient. The public should not be forced to
endure invasions of their privacy for the sake of the few ill-informed.
If in fact these ill-informed exist, bar associations should undertake an
effort to identify and educate them as to their legal rights.
57. Id.
58. By "dignity" I do not mean an arrogance or self-indulgence. I mean a sense of respect
for and understanding of the responsibility with which we as attorneys have been vested.
59. "This view of the legal profession need not be rooted in romanticism or self-serving
sanctimony, though of course it can be. Rather, special ethical standards for lawyers are prop-
erly understood as an appropriate means of restraining lawyers in the exercise of the unique
power that they inevitably wield in a political system like ours." Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,
486 U.S. 466, 489 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
60. See Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2381 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2381-82.
1996]
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Kennedy also argues that the thirty-day ban "is censorship, pure
and simple."63 "[U]nder the First Amendment the public, not the
State, has the right and power to decide what ideas and information
are deserving of their adherence." But this argument is a farce.
States regulate a broad spectrum of speech in interpreting the First
Amendment.65 The First Amendment protection is not all-encom-
passing, especially in the area of commercial speech.66 If Justice Ken-
nedy truly supports this position, he should oppose any and all
restrictions on speech regardless of its form, forum, or content. Ken-
nedy also argues that "[t]he Court's opinion reflects a newfound and
illegitimate confidence that it along with the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida knows what is best for the Bar and its clients."' But the fact is,
the Florida Bar Association created the rule, not the Florida Supreme
Court or the majority, and it is inherent in the organization and self-
governance of attorneys that its representatives (ie, the elected lead-
ers of the bar) do know what is best for its members and the public
they represent. The Court's ability, its role, and its "confidence" in
interpreting regulations of the organized Bar is neither newfound nor
is it illegitimate.
The New Regulation
Justice O'Connor's opinion provides a workable framework within
which States might create and enforce restrictions on attorney adver-
tising beyond the "misleading" and "involving unlawful activity" ar-
eas. Under the Central Hudson test, the government must first assert
a substantial state interest in support of its regulation.68 Florida Bar
provides that a state has a substantial state interest in protecting the
integrity of the legal profession in the eyes of the public. 69 Second,
the government must demonstrate that the restriction directly and ma-
terially advances that interest.7 ° In essence, the state must show that
the advertising it seeks to restrict actually has an adverse effect on the
public's perception of the legal profession. Empirical data submitted
to support such a contention will be key. States do not, however,
63. Id. at 2383.
64. Id. at 2386.
65. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (dangerous speech); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); New York Tines v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation).
66. "Commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values and is subject to modes of regula-
tion that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression." Florida Bar, 115 S.
Ct. at 2375 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 2386.
68. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
69. 115 S. Ct. at 2381.
70. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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have to conduct their own statistical surveys to obtain this data. "In-
deed, in other First Amendment contexts we have permitted litigants
to justify speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes
pertaining to different locales altogether... or even.., to justify
restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and simple common
sense."71 The third prong of Central Hudson requires that the regula-
tion be narrowly drawn.72 The regulation does not have to be the
least restrictive means, but there must be a reasonable fit between the
ends and the means chosen.73 The Florida Bar decision makes it clear
that in order to pass muster, the restriction must leave open sufficient
alternative means by which a member of the public might learn about
the availability of legal representation.74
CONCLUSION
Advertising as a whole is not an evil which should be eradicated. It
serves a vital role in conveying information to members of the public
concerning their legal rights and the availability of legal representa-
tion. But the need for professional restraint is clear. Intrusive solici-
tations and demeaning advertisements have pulled the profession into
a downward spiral of public disrepute and mistrust. Efforts to restrict
advertising are not a manipulation of public opinion75 but an honest
effort to protect the integrity of the entire legal system. The Supreme
Court has returned a means of control to states that they have not had
in almost twenty years. States must ensure that this opportunity is not
lost. State bar organizations should implement restrictions to assure
dignity and professionalism in attorney advertising and, in so doing,
return a greater sense of integrity to the profession as a whole.
KENT HARRELL
71. 115 S. Ct. at 2378 (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 2376.
73. See Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
74. 115 S. Ct. at 2380.
75. Id. at 2383 (Kennedy, L, dissenting).
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